Beware of the employer: financial incentives for employees may fail to prolong old age employment by Lorenz, Svenja et al.
DISCUSSION 
PAPER
/ /  S V E N J A  L O R E N Z ,  M O N A  P F I S T E R , 
A N D  T H O M A S  Z W I C K
/ /  N O . 2 0 - 0 0 7  |  0 2 / 2 0 2 0
Beware of the Employer:  
Financial Incentives  
for Employees May Fail  
to Prolong Old Age  
Employment
1 
Beware of the employer: financial incentives for employees may fail 
to prolong old age employment  
Svenja Lorenz (University of Würzburg), Mona Pfister (University of 
Würzburg), Thomas Zwick (University of Würzburg; ZEW - Leibniz Centre for 
European Economic Research, Mannheim; Research Centre for Education and 
the Labour Market (ROA), Maastricht)1 
Abstract 
This paper shows that increasing the normal retirement age and introducing pension deductions for 
retirement before normal retirement age in Germany did not prolong employment of older men. The 
reason for this surprising result is that employers encouraged their employees to use the bridge 
options unemployment or partial retirement instead of the early retirement option for the long-term 
insured. Bridge options allowed employers to terminate employment considerably earlier than the 
pension for long-term insured. Employers however had to compensate their employees for the 
substantially higher costs of the bridge options. Therefore mainly employers with high employment 
adaption costs induced employees to use a bridge option during the implementation phase of the 
pension reform.  
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1 Introduction 
In response to rising life expectancy, low fertility rates, and a shrinking labor force, most OECD 
countries have revised their retirement policies and introduced a series of pension reforms since the 
1990s (OECD, 2007, 2015). For example, these countries have increased the normal retirement age 
(NRA)2 and early retirement age (ERA)3, tightened eligibility rules for early pension claims, or 
introduced actuarial deductions from pension entitlements for employees who retired before the 
NRA. The main goal of these reforms was to increase labor supply among older employees and 
extend their working lives (see the overview presented by Börsch-Supan and Coile, 2018).4 All of 
these legislative efforts have addressed labor supply to achieve their goals instead of increasing labor 
demand for older employees. Accordingly, most papers evaluating the labor market consequences of 
the pension reforms have explicitly or implicitly assumed that employees could react autonomously 
to the labor supply incentives set by these reforms and that labor demand reaction is infinitely elastic 
(Dorn and Sousa-Poza, 2010; Rabaté, 2019). In this paper, we show that the employment changes of 
older men after a pension reform in Germany addressing labor supply cannot be explained by 
employee reactions. We argue instead that some employers induced employees to early retirement 
forms that allowed them to terminate employment earlier than other retirement options. The 
massive shift into these retirement forms thwarted the success of the pension reform.  
The 1992 pension5 reform in Germany is the earliest attempt in Germany to increase employment of 
older employees (Schmähl, 2003; Geyer and Steiner, 2014; Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, 
2015; Bönke et al., 2018). The reform therefore set an important example for other developed 
countries that introduced similar pension reforms later (Börsch-Supan and Coile, 2018). The reform 
exclusively addressed labor supply: The NRA was increased in monthly steps for almost all pension 
forms that granted access to early retirement. More specifically, for older male employees, the 
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 The NRA is the age at which people can first draw full benefits without actuarial deductions. Other 
expressions are “pensionable age” (OECD, 2011: 20) or “social security statutory eligibility age” (SEA, Börsch-
Supan and Coile, 2018). In Germany, the NRA is lower than the statutory retirement age for several pension 
forms. 
3
 ERA is the earliest age at which people can leave the labor market if they are eligible for one of the early 
retirement pensions (60 or 63 years for our sample). 
4
 Examples of pension reforms and their implementation years are as follows: increase in statutory retirement 
age (Denmark in 2015, Germany in 2012, Italy in 2003, the UK in 2018, and the US in 2003); increase in ERA 
(Belgium in 2013, Germany in 2012, Japan in 2001, and Sweden in 1998); tightening of eligibility rules for 
claiming pensions early (Belgium in 2013, France in 2014, and Italy in 2011); introduction of partial retirement 
options (Germany in 1996, Austria in 2000, Sweden in 1996, and France in 1988); introduction of actuarial 
deductions from pension entitlements for employees who retire early (Germany in 1997 and Austria in 1996 
and 2000). 
5
 The reform is formally called Rentenreformgesetz 1992 (BGB I 2261) from 28.12.1989. Several changes to this 
reform law were introduced after its conception before the reform was implemented (Gesetz zur Förderung 
eines gleitenden Übergangs in den Ruhestand, 1996; Wachstums- und Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz, 1997; 
Rentenreformgesetz, 1997). Also compare Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2004) and Börsch-Supan and Coile (2018), 
Fig. 3. We only refer to the parts of the reform laws that were actually implemented. 
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pension reform increased NRA for the pension for the long-term insured and for the pension after 
unemployment. The reform also introduced actuarial deductions in pension entitlements for the 
difference between retirement age and the NRA, but left the ERA unchanged (both, NRA and ERA 
used to be the same before the reform). Finally, the reform introduced a bridge option of partial 
retirement with eligibility rules comparable to the existing bridge option of early retirement after 
unemployment (Berg et al., 2019; Huber et al., 2016). 
We show that the goal of longer employment has not been met for employees affected by the 
pension reform; employment after the ERA actually decreased with increasing NRA and the 
associated pension deductions. We argue that the main reason for the employment reduction is a 
large shift of employees from the pension for the long-term insured into the bridge options. In 
addition, we observe a large decrease in employment after the ERA in the partial retirement bridge 
option during the implementation phase. This surprising finding is not consistent with individual 
utility maximizing behavior, the predictions of ex ante evaluations of the expected effects of the 1992 
pension reform, and international evidence on the employment effects of similar pension reforms. 
The pattern however fits the interpretation that employers pushed their employees into bridge 
options. They wanted to avoid longer employment after ERA for employees using the pension for 
long-term insured induced by the reform. The implementation phase of the pension reform took 
place during a deep recession and it was costly for many employers to prolong the employment of 
their older employees. We show that compensation payments necessary to induce a shift from the 
pension for the long-term insured into the bridge options were substantial and especially firms with 
high employment adaptation costs were mainly responsible for the large influx of older employees 
into the bridge options. 
We use representative administrative social security data from the Institute for Employment 
Research (Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies, SIAB7514) that cover labor market history 
and employer information for more than 24,000 men eligible for all types of early retirement 
affected by the reform. We calculate the changes in labor market outcomes by comparing the 
behavior of birth cohorts not affected (1935 and 1936) with that of birth cohorts affected by the 
reform (1937–1941) for the entire implementation phase of the reform (1997–2006). To identify the 
pension reform effects, our diff-in-diff approach exploits the cohort-specific variation of the size of 
actuarial deductions given an ERA. In addition to the effect of financial incentives set by the pension 
reform, we also calculate the full effects of the reform by comparing labor market outcomes 
between the last cohort not affected by the reform and the cohorts affected. 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. It presents the first integral ex post analysis 
of the effects of the 1992 pension reform on employment, unemployment, and partial retirement on 
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men eligible for all early retirement options affected. To the best of our knowledge we for the first 
time show for a pension reform that financial incentives were thwarted by employers and that 
employment even decreased with pension penalties during its implementation phase. We therefore 
demonstrate that the positive employment effects predicted by individual utility maximization theory 
and by ex-ante studies of the reform have not occurred. We in addition show that especially 
employees working for employers with high employment adaptation costs used bridge options. 
Finally, we discuss the policy implications of the insight that employers have been able to thwart the 
intended positive employment effects of a pension reform.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the institutional background of the 
pension system in Germany and the 1992 pension reform. We also derive theoretical predictions of 
the reform effect on the labor market and discuss the relevant empirical literature. In Section 3, we 
introduce our dataset and provide descriptive statistics of the labor market of older men. Section 4 
explains our estimation approach and presents the estimation results. Section 5 discusses the results 
and Section 6 suggests some political implications. Section 7 provides a conclusion. 
 
2 Institutional background and the 1992 pension reform 
The German pension system 
The German public retirement insurance is financed by a pay-as-you-go scheme (BMAS, 2016a). It 
covers about 80% of an average retiree’s income in Germany (BMAS, 2016b: 11; Deutsche 
Rentenversicherung Bund, 2017: 9). Nearly 80% of the labor force is mandatorily covered by the 
public retirement insurance (Hanel, 2010).6 The German statutory pension insurance provides the 
standard old age pension at age 65 for all cohorts we consider. To allow flexible retirement entry, 
there were two main early retirement options for men before the 1992 pension reform: the pension 
after unemployment (Altersrente wegen Arbeitslosigkeit, Social Code VI §237) and the pension for 
the long-term insured (Altersrente für langjährig Versicherte, Social Code VI §236). To be eligible for 
the pension after unemployment, an employee needed at least 15 qualifying periods7 and at least 8 
years of compulsory contributions periods in the last 10 years before retirement.8 In addition, the 
unemployment period had to be at least 52 weeks in the 1.5 years before retiring.9 The pension after 
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 Mainly civil servants and some self-employed workers are not covered. 
7
 A qualifying period is a period in which an employee is active in the labor market, for example, via 
employment, unemployment, or family breaks. For further details, see Lorenz et al. (2018).  
8
 Because we cannot observe retirement entry, we use the labor market exit date to calculate the eligibility 
conditions. 
9
 Since January 1, 2000, people must have been unemployed for at least 52 weeks in total after reaching the 
age of 58 years and 6 months to be eligible for the pension for the unemployed. However, this change had no 
practical consequences for financial incentives and eligibility rules for the old age pension for the unemployed. 
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unemployment allowed entry into early retirement at age 60. Hence, older employees could exit 
employment as soon as 57 years and 4 months because unemployment benefits were paid for a 
maximum period of 32 months. The ERA for the long-term insured was at age 63 and no exit from 
employment before ERA was possible. To be eligible for the old age pension for the long-term 
insured, employees needed at least 35 years of pension benefit contributions.  
The 1992 pension reform 
In the years before the implementation of the 1992 pension reform in January 1996, the share of 
older men who used the regular old age pension remained stable at about 20%. However, the share 
of older men who used the early retirement option for the long-term insured decreased from 20% in 
1990 to 13% in 1995, and the number of those using the pension after unemployment increased 
from 14% to 24% during the same period (Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, 2018: 62). The shift 
towards the pension after unemployment decreased average employment exit age and burdened 
public unemployment insurance by 7.5 EUR billion in 1995 alone (Albrecht and Müller, 1996).  
The main aims of the 1992 pension reform were to reduce the unsustainably high early retirement 
costs as well as the share of employees in unemployment before early retirement and to extend 
employment beyond the ERA for those eligible for early retirement. The huge increase in financial 
pressure on unemployment insurance led politicians in 1996 to implement the reform beginning in 
1997, instead of in 2001 as previously planned. The immediately affected birth cohort 1937 
accordingly was taken by surprise and could not adjust to the reform in advance (Riphahn and 
Schrader, 2019). The reform introduced permanent actuarial deductions in pension benefits for 
retirement benefit claims before the NRA (Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, 2015; Hanel, 2010; 
Hanel and Riphahn, 2012; Lalive and Staubli, 2015; Engels et al., 2017; Geyer et al., 2019). The 
deductions amounted to 0.3% of pension entitlements for each month the individual retired before 
the NRA of the pension form chosen. The NRA and ERA were identical before the reform and the NRA 
for early retirement options increased by 1 month each month starting in January 1996 until the 
statutory retirement age of 65 years was reached (in December 1997 for the pension for the long-
term insured and in December 2001 for the pension after unemployment). The difference between 
NRA and ERA for the old age pension after unemployment was 5 years (60–65 years) after the full 
implementation of the reform and retiring at the ERA after unemployment resulted in maximum 
deductions of 18%. The difference between NRA and ERA for those who used the old age pension for 
the long-term insured was 2 years after the full implementation of the reform and the maximum 
deduction accordingly was 7.2%.  
The pension entitlement is a product of the sum of the earnings points (Entgeltpunkte) and the 
annually adjusted current pension value (aktueller Rentenwert). The annual earnings points are 
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calculated by relating the individual gross income to the average gross income of all German 
employees for the year, as shown in the official statistics. Accordingly, the pension benefits in year t 
can be calculated for before the 1992 pension reform as 
        
       (∑               
       
     )                       .   (1) 
Pension entitlements are the sum of all annual pension entitlements collected over the entire career.  
The pension formula in equation (1) is supplemented by an age factor, D, that causes a 0.3% 
permanent deduction of the pension benefits per month of retirement before the NRA after the 
1992 pension reform:  
        
        (∑               
       
     )                                         . (2) 
In (2), D depends on month of birth c and the age of benefit claiming. For example, if an individual 
born in December 1937 retires after unemployment at age 60 in December 1997, D is 3.6%. For an 
individual born 1 year later in December 1938, the deductions at retirement age 60 are 7.2%.  
Introduction of partial retirement option 
In addition to increasing the NRA and introducing pension deductions for early retirement, the 1992 
pension reform extended the eligibility rules for the old age pension after unemployment to 
employees whose employers offered them partial retirement according to the law on partial 
retirement (Altersteilzeitgesetz), a progressive retirement plan. The new partial retirement act was 
implemented on August 1, 1996. It complemented similar rules already in place in collective 
bargaining agreements in selected sectors, such as the insurance, chemical, and tobacco industries as 
well as the banking sector (Schmähl, 2003). The existing partial retirement options and other early 
retirement options, including the Pre-Retirement Act or the Part-time Work in Old Age Act, had 
hardly been used before 1996, and thus these early retirement options had no measurable effect on 
employment or retirement behavior.  
Also the introduction of the new partial retirement option was intended to extend employment of 
older employees (Oswald, 1999; Berg et al., 2019; Eurofound, 2016). Arguments used were that 
reducing working time could provide an alternative for leaving the labor market early for workers 
who were not able to work full time any more (Wadensjö, 2006) or reduce tensions between work 
and caregiving (Berg et al., 2019). The crucial innovation of the new rules with respect to previous 
partial retirement rules was its integration into the pension for the unemployed law (Schmähl, 2003). 
This integration was intended to reduce the high cost burden on the unemployment insurance if 
employers offered early retirement after partial retirement instead of dismissing their older 
employees into early retirement after unemployment. Consequently, the law on partial retirement 
introduced a new early retirement option with the same eligibility rules, NRA, and ERA as the old age 
7 
pension after unemployment. 10 The attractiveness of the additional early retirement venue was 
further increased by offering the so-called block model. The block model consisted of two periods of 
equal length: in the first half, the employee worked full-time and in the second half, the employee 
was completely released from work (Freistellungsphase) (Kirchner and Mittelhamm, 2010; 
Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2015; Huber et al., 2016). For a standard 5-year partial retirement 
program, the employee could exit employment at age 57.5 and retire at the ERA.11 The block model 
proved to be much more popular than the continuity model (Koller, 2001). About half of the 
employers only offered the block model option (Klammer and Weber, 2001) and the share of 
employees using the block model was higher than 80% from the start and reached more than 90% in 
later years (Koller, 2001; Brussig et al., 2009). 
Incentive effects of the 1992 pension reform on labor supply  
In accordance with most retirement literature, we first assume that older men take the decision 
regarding the optimal date of employment exit according to the option value model of Stock and 
Wise (1990). Employees compare all possible future streams of utility from income and leisure and 
they delay employment exit if this increases their stream of utility. In this framework, exiting 
employment at any early date s instead of any later date t has the following effects: it decreases 
utility because wage earnings during the period between s and t are lost; it increases utility because 
leisure is preferred to working during s and t; it increases utility because pension benefits are 
received between s and t; and it decreases utility because the expected present value of future 
pension benefits is lower during the remaining lifetime. Hence, exiting employment earlier is 
preferred if the loss in earnings income and present values of pension entitlements are at least 
outweighed by higher utility from leisure and pension benefits received between s and t. The 1992 
pension reform reduced the utility of early retirement because it reduced the present value of 
pension entitlements and the pensions received between s and t for all three early retirement forms. 
All other determinants of retirement entry, especially the ERA, pension eligibility and the calculation 
of pension claims remained unchanged. 
The option value model therefore predicts that older men eligible for early retirement extended their 
employment or partial retirement between their ERA and NRA.12 The exit age from employment and 
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 Eligibility rules for the pension for the unemployed and partial retirement are identical. The minimum period 
of 52 weeks in unemployment corresponds to the requirement that employees were employed for at least 24 
months under a progressive retirement plan after reaching the age of 55. 
11
 The alternative partial retirement form was called the continuity model, in which employees could reduce 
their working hours (e.g., working half days) during the entire partial retirement period. 
12
 Partial retirement employment after ERA can be extended either by shifting the partial retirement spell by a 
given spell duration, thereby delaying exiting employment, or by extending the partial retirement spell at a 
given exit from employment. It is unclear a priori which version an older employee prefers because he must 
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partial retirement should increase with birth cohort because younger cohorts face larger differences 
between the ERA and NRA.  
After discussing the utility optimal reaction to the pension reform for the pension options, we discuss 
whether the individual incentives for choosing the pension options changed. The relative 
attractiveness of the bridge options compared with the pension for the long-term insured remained 
the same according to the option value model for all birth cohorts until 1939. The pension 
deductions increased in tandem for all three early retirement options and the ERA was unchanged. 
Therefore, the option value model does not predict a substitution effect between pension options for 
these cohorts. Nevertheless, for the 1939–1941 birth cohorts, the relative attractiveness of the old 
age pension for the long-term insured increased. The difference between the NRA of the bridge 
options compared with the NRA for the pension for the long-term insured was 3 years for those born 
before 1939 and it disappeared for those born in December 1941. The maximum additional pension 
penalty associated with the pension for the long-term insured compared with the bridge options 
decreased from 7.2% to 0% for the cohorts from December 1939 to December 1941.13 Thus, the 
option value theory predicts that for the 1939–1941 cohorts, the shares of employees who chose the 
pension for the long-term insured increased. 
Previous empirical analyses of the effects of the 1992 pension reform 
Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2004) and Hanel (2010) used option value models to evaluate the effects 
of the 1992 pension reform ex ante. Hanel (2010) estimated the transition rates out of employment 
after the ERA, although only observations until the end of 2002 were included, and thus the youngest 
cohort included in the study (born in 1942) did not reach the ERA at the end of the observation 
period. Hanel (2010) predicted a small positive employment effect of the pension reform. Berkel and 
Börsch-Supan (2004) simulated the effect of actuarially fair pension deductions according to the 1992 
pension reform on the retirement decision. They used the actual retirement behavior of employees 
in a period before the reform (1984–1997) and predicted an increase in retirement age for men of 
almost 2 years.  
Bönke et al. (2018) analyzed the effects of the 1992 pension reform on West German men eligible for 
the pension for the long-term insured who still worked at age 63. The empirical analysis was based 
on the Insurance Account Sample (Versicherungskontenstichprobe) with a sample size between 44 
and 122 men per birth cohort between 1935 and 1945. As a reaction to the reform, they found an 
average delay in retirement age of 5.2 months, and the delay increased from cohort 1937 to 1940, 
and then remained stable.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
weigh the utility costs of shorter leisure against financial costs of longer financial reductions during partial 
retirement. 
13
 The maximum penalty between both pension forms occurred for a retirement age of 63. 
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Riphahn and Schrader (2019) analyzed the effects of the 1992 pension reform on West German men 
for birth cohorts 1937–1939. They concentrated on men eligible for the pension for the unemployed. 
In their intention to treat regressions, they did not find significant employment effects but a 
significant increase in unemployment duration after the ERA. They only included labor market effects 
between the ages of 60 and 62, and they could not distinguish partial retirement and regular 
employment spells. 
Geyer and Welteke (2019), Engels et al. (2017), and Geyer et al. (2019) analyzed the effect of the 
pension reform on employment, unemployment, and partial retirement on female employees. Their 
estimation of the postponement of retirement by about 15 months corresponds to the value 
predicted by Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2004) in their ex ante prediction for females.  
3 Data 
We use a large, high-quality dataset of administrative individual labor market histories provided by 
the Federal Employment Agency in Germany (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). The dataset consists of a 2% 
sample of the population with social security contributions from 1975 to 2014 (SIAB 7514).14 The 
dataset contains daily information about employment, receipt of benefits according to German Social 
Books II and III, job seeking, and active labor market measures. An advantage of the SIAB is that 
spells in partial retirement are identifiable. In the data, we cannot distinguish the two partial 
retirement models. As we know that more than 80% of the employees chose the block model, we 
assume that all employees in our sample choose the block model in our main specifications. Thus, we 
determine the actual employment exit for men in partial retirement by halving the period of partial 
retirement.15  
Our data do not contain information on pension insurance, such as pension entitlements, eligibility, 
or actual pension choice.16 Therefore, we determine individual pension entitlements, deductions 
associated with a certain pension age, the expectancy criteria for the pension forms, and the 
corresponding ERA and NRA according to Lorenz et al. (2018) and Pfister et al. (2018). We observe 
whether an individual used the pension for the unemployed and pension after partial retirement by 
checking whether the individual had at least 52 weeks of unemployment or 24 months of partial 
retirement before labor market exit. If older employees exit employment between their 63rd and 65th 
birthday without an unemployment spell of more than 52 weeks or a partial retirement spell before, 
                                                                
14
 A detailed description of the SIAB can be found in Antoni et al. (2016). 
15
 An alternative would be to use the part-time indicator provided in the SIAB to identify those who use the 
block model and those who use the continuity model (also compare Berg et al., 2019). We do not use this 
method because employers were not required by law to report the working time of their employees, and thus 
this variable has many missings and is unreliable. 
16
 We use the daily date of birth in the dataset for the exact calculation of pension entitlements. We are 
grateful to Philip vom Berge and Dana Müller from the FDZ at the IAB for merging this information as part of 
the Custom Shaped Administrative Data for the Analysis of Labor Market (CADAL) project. 
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we assume that employees chose the pension for the long-term insured. We observe labor market 
and employment exit, but not pension entry. Therefore, we calculate the maximum pension 
deductions induced if individuals stepped into retirement immediately after labor market exit. If 
there are gaps between labor market exit and pension entry, realized deductions are lower (Hanel, 
2010). 
Sample restrictions 
We restrict our sample to men born between 1935 and 1941. We exclude civil servants and self-
employed entrepreneurs because these population groups have not been eligible for the pension 
forms affected by the 1992 pension reform. To obtain average treatment of the treated effects, we 
restrict our sample further to the approximately 84% of men who fulfill the eligibility requirements 
for the pension after unemployment and the pension after partial retirement.17 In addition, we 
restrict our sample to men with high labor market attachment in the years before they become 
eligible for an early pension. We use this further restriction because only these employees can 
choose when to retire and which pension to take because individuals who are unemployed or out of 
the labor market after age 55 for a long time are unlikely return to employment in Germany in the 
years included in this study (OECD, 2013). More specifically, our sample is restricted to men who are 
employed subject to social security at least once after the age of 55 (this restriction is also used, for 
example, by Hanel, 2010 and Geyer et al., 2019) and who are employed, in partial retirement, or 
unemployed at age 59.18 Moreover, we do not consider men with missing information on the 
establishment-specific characteristics at the last employment.19 Finally, we exclude the few seamen 
and miners because they enjoyed special protection of legitimate expectation rules for early 
retirement in the 1992 pension reform that we cannot identify in our dataset.20  
In our data, we cannot test directly whether all employees included are eligible for the pension for 
the long-term insured. However, we know from an analysis based on the BASiD dataset that for our 
sample restrictions, about 93% of the men eligible for the bridge options were also eligible for the 
pension for the long-term insured (Lorenz et al., 2018). Thus, we assume that all employees in our 
sample who reached their 63rd birthday in employment were eligible for the pension for the long-
term insured and that we incur only a small measurement error by assuming that all employees were 
eligible for all three early retirement forms. Please note that we do not differentiate between 
retirement at NRA and early retirement using the pension for the long-term insured because the 
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The share of eligible people in our data corresponds to the share of 86% we find in BASiD, another sample of 
the IEB  (Integrated Employment Biographies) that includes the eligibility information on bridge options and 
other pension forms (Lorenz et al., 2018). 
18
 In our sample, 13% of older employees are deleted in the first step and 23% are deleted in the second step. 
19
 In our sample, 16% of older employees with missing employer characteristics are deleted.  
20 
In our sample, less than 1% of older employees are seamen and miners.  
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share of employees who retired at age 65  was smaller than one percent for all birth cohorts included 
in our sample. After applying the sample restrictions, we are left with 24,882 men. 
There were two other early retirement options available for men in the birth cohorts we look at that 
were not included in the 1992 pension reform. The employees in the old age pension for severely 
disabled people and the pension for those with reduced earnings capacity did not face pension 
deductions on early retirement (Riphahn and Schrader, 2019). To ensure that there is no program 
substitution, there ideally should be no employees eligible for these early retirement options in our 
dataset. The pension for those with reduced earnings capacity allowed employees to retire 
immediately when they were not able to work anymore in their occupation 
(Berufsunfähigkeit/Erwerbsunfähigkeit). Average retirement age for those with reduced earnings 
capacity was around age 53 for men born in the birth cohorts we focus on (Deutsche 
Rentenversicherung Bund, 2018). As a consequence, almost all men entering the pension for those 
with reduced earnings capacity left the labor market before age 59, and thus they are not included in 
our sample (Lorenz et al., 2018). In addition, reduced earnings capacity had to be assessed in a 
medical exam and it was hard to obtain eligibility without a legitimate reason.  
We cannot discount the possibility that there are some employees who are eligible for the old age 
pension for severely disabled people in our dataset.21 We should keep in mind that health-related 
eligibility criteria for disability pensions are relatively strict in Germany and that more than 50% of 
the applications for pensions for severely disabled people are rejected (Engels et al., 2017). 
Therefore, we can assume that there is no program substitution into other (unobservable) early 
retirement schemes as a reaction to the 1992 pension reform in our sample. However, we may 
attribute pension deductions to severely disabled people who retire before their NRA although they 
can leave at the ERA without pension deductions. 
Descriptive evidence 
We find sizeable differences in the employment rates between the cohorts (Figure 1). The age-
specific employment rate, which includes regular employment without the active phase of partial 
retirement, was always higher for the pre-reform cohorts (red lines) up to age 63 than for the treated 
cohorts (blue lines). Although pension deductions for exiting employment before the NRA increased 
with cohort after 1937, the employment rates between the ERA and age 63 decreased with cohort. 
The reduction in regular employment was not compensated for by a shift of employment into partial 
retirement. Employment shares including the active phase of partial retirement also decreased with 
cohort between age 60 and 63 (Figure A1). After age 63, the employment rate of the cohorts affected 
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 The share of employees who used the pension for severely disabled people was just 8% in the cohorts we 
focus on and there is no increase in usage of this pension form for birth cohorts affected by the reform 
(Deutsche Rentenversicherung, 2018). 
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by the pension reform exceeded the pre-reform rates. The employment increase therefore was 
positively related to the pension deductions for men choosing the pension for long-term insured 
(compare Figures 1 and A1). 
Fig. 1. Employment rate (without working phase of partial retirement) by age (monthly data) and cohort. 
Source: SIAB 7514, own calculations. 
For all cohorts affected by the pension reform, unemployment rates were higher than for cohorts not 
affected before age 60 (Figure 2). The rise in the unemployment rate before age 60 in the treatment 
cohorts seems to be a consequence of the general business cycle that led to large unemployment 
increases. Unemployment shares of West German males doubled between 1991 and 1997 from 5.6% 
to 11%. The unemployment of older employees increased more than proportionally; the share of 
unemployed aged 55–65 for all unemployed increased from 14% to 21% in the same period. After 
1997, the unemployment share decreased to 8.5% in 2001. The share of unemployed aged 55–65 
reached its peak of 23% in 1999, and then decreased (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2019). The 
unemployment pattern of men in our sample before age 60 closely followed the general business 
cycle with a peak of older unemployed for birth cohort 1938. After age 60, unemployment was 
higher between the ERA and NRA for almost all cohorts affected by the pension reform and 
unemployment after the ERA increased with pension deductions. 
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Fig. 2. Unemployment rates by age (monthly data) and cohort. Source: SIAB 7514, own calculations. 
The incidence of partial retirement in cohorts 1935 to 1937 was almost 0% (Figure 3). Partial 
retirement increased greatly after the introduction of the new partial retirement rules. Few 
employees remained in partial retirement beyond age 63. Younger cohorts could enter partial 
retirement at a younger age; cohort 1937 was 60 years old when the first employers offered partial 
retirement in 1997. This is the reason why the minimum entry age into partial retirement decreased 
from cohort to cohort. The peak use of partial retirement decreased from men who were older than 
62 to those aged 60. Therefore, we do not see the expected positive correlation between pension 
deductions for early retirement and partial retirement exit.  
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Fig. 3. Partial retirement rates by age (monthly data) and cohort. Source: SIAB 7514, own calculations. 
In the next step, we look more closely at aggregate statistics of labor market indicators by birth 
cohort. The analysis clarifies whether changes in labor market outcomes before and during the 
implementation phase of the pension reform come from changes in behavior given a retirement 
option or from substitution effects between retirement options. The first four columns of Table 1 
show the development of average labor market exit age for different labor market states. Column 1 
in Table 1 demonstrates that labor market exit age that includes release periods during partial 
retirement and unemployment only increased slightly with pension deductions for cohorts 1937 to 
1941. The increase in labor market exit age was mainly driven by older men staying longer in 
unemployment (unemployment exit age increased by more than 9 months) and an increase in 
employment after the ERA by men using the pension for the long-term insured (labor market age 
increased by 6 months) (Table 1, columns II and IV). The positive correlations between pension 
deductions and labor market attachment for the unemployed and those in the pension for the long-
term insured were compensated for by the strong reduction in average labor market exit age of 
those in partial retirement by 15 months (Table 1, column III). The strong decrease in labor market 
exit age for those in partial retirement also drove the slight reduction in average employment exit 
age including the active phase in partial retirement (Table 1, column V). 
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Table 2 shows changes in the incidence of pension forms. The share of older men using partial 
retirement as a bridge dramatically increased from almost 0% before the reform to more than 23% in 
cohort 1941. The increase in the share of employees in partial retirement did not reduce the share of 
employees in the pension after unemployment; their share instead also increased from 27% before 
the reform to 42% for the first cohorts affected by the pension reform. The share of older men who 
used the pension for the unemployed only started to decrease slightly for cohort 1941. The share of 
older men using the pension for the long-term insured almost halved from 72% in cohort 1935 to less 
than 40% in cohort 1941, accordingly (Table 2, column I).22 
Cohort 
Average 
labor 
market exit 
age 
Average labor 
market exit age 
for pension 
after 
unemployment 
Average labor 
market exit age 
for pension 
after partial 
retirement 
Average labor 
market exit age 
for pension for 
long-term insured 
Average 
employment 
exit age 
 I II III IV V 
1935 62.23 61.35 
 
63.53 61.50 
1936 62.40 61.39 
 
63.64 61.52 
1937 62.34 61.35 63.34 63.64 61.28 
1938 62.51 61.66 62.83 63.84 61.14 
1939 62.53 61.86 62.72 63.85 61.12 
1940 62.56 61.95 62.46 63.93 61.07 
1941 62.58 62.14 62.09 63.98 61.05 
Total 62.47 61.75 62.42 63.77 61.21 
N 24,882 9,198 2,494 13,190 24,882 
Tab. 1. Descriptive statistics of labor market exit age by pension form. Age measured in years. 
Notes: Values in the columns correspond to the mean. We set the age at 63 if we attribute the pension for the 
long-term insured and observe a labor market exit age below 63. Employment exit includes active phase of 
partial retirement. Source: SIAB 7514, own calculations. 
  
                                                                
22
 The changes in pension shares in our sample are also found for the universe of older men. The share of 
employees in the pension for the long-term insured gradually decreased from more than 17% in cohort 1937 to 
11% in cohort 1941. The share of those claiming the pension for the unemployed/partial retirement gradually 
increased from around 25% to almost 31% between cohort 1937 and cohort 1941. The share of older men in 
the regular old age pension increased from less than 19% in cohort 1937 to 24% in cohort 1941 (Deutsche 
Rentenversicherung Bund, 2018).  
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Cohort 
Share of men with old 
age pension for long-
term insured in % 
Share of men with old age 
pension after 
unemployment in % 
Share of men with old age 
pension after partial 
retirement in % 
 I II III 
1935 72.66 27.34 /
23 
1936 70.03 29.97 / 
1937 64.04 34.17 1.79 
1938 50.87 41.94 7.20 
1939 48.01 41.42 10.58 
1940 41.42 40.91 17.67 
1941 39.77 37.12 23.11 
Total 53.01 36.97 10.02 
N 24,882 24,882 24,882 
Tab. 2. Descriptive statistics of shares of pension forms. Source: SIAB 7514, own calculations. 
Finally, we look at important labor market indicators given a retirement path. Partial retirement 
duration increased by 0.6 years (or 7.6 months) (Table 3, column I). This increase was not a 
consequence of a longer labor market spell after the ERA (column II), but of a longer spell in partial 
retirement in the age bracket 55–60 from 0 years to more than 1.1 years (column III). Average 
employment exit age from partial retirement decreased by 1.5 years during the implementation 
period, accordingly (column V). The share of those employees who entered partial retirement after 
age 63 was negligible for all cohorts besides birth cohort 1937 (column IV). 
Cohort 
Partial 
retirement 
duration 
Partial 
retirement 
duration after 
age 60 
Partial 
retirement 
duration from 
age 55 to 60 
Share entry in 
partial retirement 
after age 63 in % 
Average 
employment exit 
age for those in 
partial retirement 
 I II III IV V 
1937 2.09 2.07 0.02 6.90 62.25 
1938 2.15 1.95 0.19 1.53 61.71 
1939 2.38 2.00 0.39 1.17 61.45 
1940 2.51 1.83 0.68 0.92 61.22 
1941 2.72 1.60 1.12 0.41 60.71 
Total 2.52 1.79 0.74 0.96 61.13 
N 2,494 2,494 2,494 2,494 2,494 
Tab. 3. Descriptive statistics for those in partial retirement. Durations and age measured in years. Source: 
SIAB 7514, own calculations. 
Total unemployment duration for those choosing the pension after unemployment only increased 
slightly with pension deductions (Table 4, column I). The large increase in unemployment duration 
after ERA (almost 4 months, column II) was partly compensated for by a decrease in the 
unemployment duration before age 60 by less than 2 months (column III). Thus, employers dismissed 
                                                                
23
The symbol form“/” means that for data protection reasons, all values based on fewer than 20 observations 
are deleted (Forschungsdatenzentrum der Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2017). 
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their employees later; average employment exit age increased slightly by 4 months from cohort 1937 
to 1941 (column V). The share of those older men using the pension after unemployment who 
entered unemployment after 63 was negligible (column IV). 
 
Cohort 
Unemployment 
duration 
Unemployment 
duration after 
60 
Unemployment 
duration from 
age 55 to 60 
Share entry in 
unemployment 
after 63 in % 
Average 
employment exit 
age for 
unemployed 
 I II III IV V 
1935 2.02 0.89 1.13 / 59.42 
1936 2.25 0.86 1.39 / 59.19 
1937 2.37 0.78 1.59 / 59.03 
1938 2.43 0.80 1.63 1.70 59.08 
1939 2.41 0.88 1.53 1.38 59.22 
1940 2.45 0.93 1.51 1.47 59.27 
1941 2.58 1.10 1.48 1.96 59.36 
Total 2.40 0.90 1.50 1.44 59.22 
N 9,198 9,198 9,198 9,198 9,198 
Tab. 4. Descriptive statistics for those in the pension after unemployment. Durations and age measured in 
years. Source: SIAB 7514, own calculations. 
Employment exit for those using the pension for the long-term insured increased by 5 months from 
63 years and 5 months to 63 years and 10 months during the implementation period. Given that 
employment exit decreased by 18 months for those in partial retirement (Table 4, column V) and 
increased by 4 months for those using the pension after unemployment (Table 5, column V), 
employers could increase the difference in average employment exit age during the implementation 
phase.  
4 Multivariate estimations  
We analyze whether the descriptive results of the changes before and during the implementation 
phase of the pension reform are also obtained when we control for changes in labor supply and 
demand factors. For the multivariate identification of the effects of the pension deductions on the 
labor market participation of older workers, we follow the empirical approaches proposed by 
Mastrobuoni (2009) and Engels et al. (2017). All employees in a certain cohort are affected equally by 
the reform, so we cannot construct an intra-cohort comparison group (Bönke et al., 2018). The 
impact of financial incentives induced by the pension reform on labor market states therefore is 
calculated for adjacent birth cohorts of older men as 
                                                   (3) 
where      is an indicator variable for labor state m of individual i at time t. The labor market state 
after the ERA can be employment (without and with the active phase of partial retirement), partial 
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retirement (including the release phase of partial retirement), and unemployment. The variable    
measures the time-varying deductions from pension entitlements for those who enter retirement 
before the NRA (in months) when they have been born in a certain birth cohort (by birth month). We 
differentiate between the deductions taken owing to the NRA for the bridge options and the NRA for 
the pension for the long-term insured according to the pension an individual actually chose. 
Furthermore, we include monthly age fixed effects (    ); monthly cohort fixed effects (   ); 
individual labor supply variables, including pension wealth at age 55 and job exposure matrices (JEM) 
proposed by Kroll (2011) to measure overall, physical, and psycho-social job demands24. We also take 
into changes in the legislation for disability pensions and in the entitlement rules for unemployment 
insurance (   )
25 . In addition, we include labor demand indicators (    , such as regional 
unemployment rates at the place of work and characteristics of the last employer before leaving the 
labor market such as mean wage and characteristics of all employees and firm size The full list of 
explanatory variables and their averages can be found in Table A1. 
The 1992 pension reform introduced partial retirement as an additional early retirement option that 
employers could offer to their workforce. Thus the effect of the reform may not be completely 
attributable to pension deductions and the increase in NRA. To calculate the overall effect of the 
pension reform on labor market outcomes including the introduction of partial retirement, we 
calculate differences in labor market outcomes between birth cohorts (in years). We assume that 
older men of adjacent birth cohorts should have behaved equally, given that there was no pension 
reform, if we control for individual and employer characteristics that influence labor market behavior 
(Krueger and Pischke, 1992; Mastrobuoni, 2009). We analyze differences in labor market behavior 
between the treated birth cohorts and the last non-treated cohort 1936 in the age group 60–65. 
More specifically, we calculate 
 (4) 
where     is a binary variable that denotes labor market state m,     are individual and     are 
establishment cohort-specific variables. The variable        measures the average difference in     
at age t between cohort c and baseline cohort 1936. The sum of the       coefficients equals the 
difference in the employment, partial retirement, or unemployment duration between cohort c and 
cohort 1936 as  
 
                                                                
24
 We match the JEM to individuals by using the classification of occupations (KldB-10). 
25
 A detailed description of the changes in the legislation for disability pensions and in the entitlement rules for 
unemployment insurance can be found in Engels et al. (2017).  
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The first specification in Table 5 (odd columns) imposes a linear correlation between pension 
deductions and labor market outcomes, the second specification (even columns) relaxes this strong 
assumption and uses indicator variables for different penalty values. In columns III and IV, we add 
labor demand variables to the labor supply indicators. In accordance with the descriptive analysis 
presented in Section 3, pension deductions are not positively correlated with employment after the 
ERA. Employees instead accepted higher pension deductions and even reduced employment when 
pension deductions for exiting employment before the NRA increased. On average, an increase in the 
deductions by 1 percentage point (PP) was associated with a reduction in the employment rate by 
about 1.2 PP (column I). For the nonlinear specification (column II), we find significantly negative 
correlations between employment and all pension penalty groups. Men facing deductions up to 18% 
had an employment rate 18.4 PP lower than men without deductions. Controlling for regional 
unemployment and employer characteristics strongly increases the R² of the estimation and the 
pension penalty coefficients increase slightly (columns III and IV). The strong substitution of regular 
employment into partial retirement does not change the negative employment results. If we add 
employment during the active phase in partial retirement to regular employment, overall 
employment also decreased with pension deductions (compare Table A2, columns I–IV). 
According to our descriptive results, pension deductions had a significantly positive correlation with 
unemployment length after the ERA. Deductions between 14.7% and 18.0% are associated with a 
significantly higher unemployment rate by 2.6 PP (column IV). Partial retirement duration after age 
60 also increased with pension deductions. When we control for employer characteristics, treated 
men with deductions up to 18% increased partial retirement rates by about 12.3 PP (column IV). 
Thus, partial retirement incidence after age 60 increased more than unemployment incidence. 
However, in both bridge paths, older men had exited employment already before the ERA. 
Table 6 shows the overall labor market changes during the implementation phase of the pension 
reform. According to our previous results, employment was reduced by almost 6 months in cohorts 
1940 and 1941 in comparison to cohort 1936. During the entire implementation phase, regular 
employment after age 60 decreased by 5.5 months (= 5 × 1.187) (see last line in column I of Table 6). 
Column III shows that partial retirement increased by more than 0.6 months for each year of NRA 
increase. Column IV shows that unemployment was 0.3 months longer for cohort 1937 compared 
∆𝑐 𝑚  ∑ 𝑡 Probt c m 𝑦i     Probt 1 36 j 𝑦𝑖     
65
𝑡 60 
  
= ∑ 𝑡  𝛽𝑡 𝑐 𝑚   𝛽𝑡−1 𝑐 𝑚  
65
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= 60  𝛽60 𝑐 𝑚  0   6   𝛽61 𝑐 𝑗𝑚  𝛽60 𝑐 𝑚   … 65 0  𝛽65 𝑐 𝑚   
= ∑ 𝛽𝑡 𝑐 𝑚  
65
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with cohort 1936 and 2 months longer for cohort 1941. On average, unemployment spells increased 
by 0.4 months for each year of NRA increase. 
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  Employment without partial retirement  Unemployment Partial retirement 
  I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
Penalty (%) -0.012** 
 
-0.014** 
 
0.001** 
 
0.001** 
 
0.007** 
 
0.006** 
 
 
(0.0005) 
 
(0.0005) 
 
(0.0003) 
 
(0.0003) 
 
(0.0003) 
 
(0.0003) 
 
No penalty 
 
Base 
 
Base 
 
Base 
 
Base 
 
Base 
 
Base 
0.3–3.6 
 
-0.031** 
 
-0.034** 
 
0.015** 
 
0.015** 
 
0.024** 
 
0.024** 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
3.9–7.2 
 
-0.071** 
 
-0.079** 
 
0.015** 
 
0.016** 
 
0.040** 
 
0.039** 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
7.5–10.8 
 
-0.109** 
 
-0.123** 
 
0.018** 
 
0.019** 
 
0.058** 
 
0.056** 
  
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
11.1–14.4 
 
-0.147** 
 
-0.169** 
 
0.021** 
 
0.022** 
 
0.085** 
 
0.082** 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
14.7–18.0 
 
-0.184** 
 
-0.213** 
 
0.025** 
 
0.026** 
 
0.125** 
 
0.123** 
  
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
Observations 1,517,802 1,517,802 1,517,802 1,517,802 1,517,802 1,517,802 1,517,802 1,517,802 1,517,802 1,517,802 1,517,802 1,517,802 
X variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Y variables No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Pre-reform 
mean 0.355       0.062       0.001       
R² 0.180 0.179 0.259 0.259 0.040 0.040 0.054 0.055 0.050 0.050 0.076 0.076 
Tab. 5. Regression results: direct effects on employment rate without partial retirement, unemployment rate, and partial retirement rate (both phases). Notes: In all 
specifications, we control for labor supply determinants. In columns III and IV, we additionally control for labor demand determinants. Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered on the individual level. Significance levels: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. The pre-reform mean is calculated for pre-reform cohorts 1935 and 1936. Source: SIAB 7514, own 
calculations. 
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Cohort 
Employment 
without partial 
retirement 
Employment 
including partial 
retirement 
Partial retirement Unemployment 
1937 -0.639 -0.343 0.296** 0.295 
 
(0.464) (0.467) (0.079) (0.216) 
1938 -2.733** -1.300** 1.433** 0.771** 
 
(0.455) (0.463) (0.124) (0.227) 
1939 -4.015** -1.928** 2.087** 1.219** 
 
(0.448) (0.455) (0.143) (0.235) 
1940 -5.728** -2.527** 3.201** 1.817** 
 (0.448) (0.458) (0.169) (0.251) 
1941 -5.806** -2.920** 2.886** 2.165** 
 (0.517) (0.539) (0.240) (0.315) 
Average change in 
employment per 
year increase in 
NRA with 
deductions of 
3.6% (months)  
-1.187** 
(0.176) 
-0.570** 
(0.178) 
0.617** 
(0.035) 
0.395** 
(0.086) 
Observations 3,010,722 3,010,722 3,010,722 3,010,722 
Tab. 6 Overall effects of the pension reform for employment without partial retirement, employment with 
partial retirement (both phases), partial retirement with release phase, and unemployment in months. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the individual level. Reference is cohort 1936. In all 
specifications, we control for labor demand and labor supply determinants. Significance levels: *p < 0.05, **p < 
0.01. Source: SIAB 7514, own calculations. 
5  Discussion 
Our descriptive and multivariate analyses give a consistent picture of the changes in labor market 
outcomes before and after the implementation of the 1992 pension reform. Pension deductions for 
early retirement plus an increase in the normal retirement age did not increase employment of older 
men after the ERA. Employment decreased more strongly with higher pension deductions at a 
certain retirement age after ERA, instead. The employment decrease is the result of a massive shift of 
employees affected by the reform from the pension for the long-term insured into bridge options. In 
addition, employment exit age from partial retirement also decreased with pension deductions. The 
increases in employment exit age before unemployment and before the pension for the long-term 
insured could not compensate for the negative employment factors. 
The decrease in employment and the strong shift into bridge options are not consistent with the 
changes intended by the pension reform. These changes are also not consistent with the predictions 
derived on basis of the option value model. They are also not consistent with positive employment 
predictions from ex ante evaluations of the reform (Berkel and Börsch-Supan, 2004; Hanel, 2010). 
Finally they contradict empirical evaluations of the labor market consequences of comparable 
pension reforms in other countries: the increase of the NRA plus actuarily fair pension deductions for 
early retirement in the USA led to a modest increase in employment for men (Mastrobuoni, 2009). A 
23 
Swiss pension reform that introduced an increase in the NRA by 1 year each in two steps and an 
actuarial pension penalty of 3.4% for retirement of 1 year before the NRA led to a large positive 
employment effect for older women (Hanel and Riphahn, 2012; Lalive and Staubli, 2015). 
Our explanation for the surprising findings is that employers motivated an increasing share of older 
men to use bridge options instead of the pension for the long-term insured. Bridge options allowed 
employers to terminate employment of their older workers on average more than four years earlier 
(see Table 4 column V) if they took unemployment instead of the pension for long-term insured and 
between more than 1 year earlier in cohort 1937 and about 3 years earlier in cohort 1941 for partial 
retirement (see Table 3 column V). The recession with strongly increasing unemployment rates made 
it necessary for employers to push employees into bridge options who were eligible for it. As most of 
these older men also were eligible for the pension for the long-term insured, employers had to 
compensate them for the higher financial costs of bridge options (see below).  
We propose several arguments that labor demand is responsible for the negative employment 
development during the implementation phase of the 1992 pension reform for men. The first 
argument is that men eligible for all three pension forms who were in employment on their 63rd 
birthday acted according to the option value theory. Practically all of these employees used the 
pension for the long-term insured instead of a bridge option (compare Tables 3 and 4, column IV). 
They used their autonomy to determine employment exit and increased their employment with 
pension deductions. We can replicate this descriptive finding if we include labor demand and supply 
variables and calculate the impact of pension deductions and the overall effect on labor market 
states on employment for those who reached age 63 in employment. Employment significantly 
increased by about 0.15 months per year of NRA increase (compare Table 8).  
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  Employment without partial retirement Unemployment Partial retirement 
  I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
Penalty (%) 0.063** 
 
0.036** 
 
-0.009** 
 
-0.008** 
 
-0.005** 
 
-0.008** 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.0008) 
 
(0.0004) 
 
(0.0004) 
 
(0.0003) 
 
(0.0004) 
 No penalty 
 
Base 
 
Base 
 
Base 
 
Base 
 
Base 
 
Base 
0.3–3.6 
 
0.147** 
 
0.054** 
 
-0.016** 
 
-0.012** 
 
-0.0006 
 
-0.011** 
  
(0.005) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
3.9–7.2 
 
0.329** 
 
0.183** 
 
-0.046** 
 
-0.041** 
 
-0.022** 
 
-0.038** 
  
(0.007) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
Observations 622,050 622,050 622,050 622,050 622,050 622,050 622,050 622,050 622,050 622,050 622,050 622,050 
X variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Y variables No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Pre-reform 
mean 0.128       0.022       0.001       
R² 0.150 0.145 0.313 0.309 0.026 0.025 0.036 0.035 0.028 0.027 0.065 0.063 
Tab. 7. Regression results: direct effects on employment rate with partial retirement, unemployment rate, and partial retirement rate (both phases) for employees 63–65 
years old. Notes: In all specifications, we control for labor supply determinants. In columns III and IV, we additionally control for labor demand determinants. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered on the individual level. Significance levels: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. The pre-reform mean is calculated for pre-reform cohorts 1935 and 1936. Source: 
SIAB 7514, own calculations.  
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Employment increase with and without the active phase in partial retirement is similar (compare 
columns I and II of Table 8) and the changes in partial retirement and unemployment with pension 
deductions are negligible (compare columns II and III of Table 7). Our results are consistent with the 
positive effect of the pension reform on pension entry for those using the pension for the long-term 
insured reported by Bönke et al. (2018). Employers therefore had to take into account that 
employment of those employees eligible for all three pension forms would shift by about half a year 
during the implementation phase of the pension reform if they did not push them into bridge options 
(compare VI of Table 1). 
Cohort 
Employment without 
active phase in partial 
retirement 
age 63–65 (months) 
Employment with active 
phase in partial 
retirement 
age 63–65 (months) 
 
 I II  
1937 0.259** 0.255*  
 
(0.099) (0.100)  
1938 0.369** 0.392**  
 
(0.102) (0.103)  
1939 0.410** 0.430**  
 
(0.098) (0.099)  
1940 0.266** 0.308**  
 (0.099) (0.100)  
1941 0.279** 0.349**  
 (0.103) (0.105)  
Average changes in employment per year 
increase in NRA with deductions of  0.141** 0.148**  
3.6% (months) (0.039) (0.039)  
Observations 622.050 622.050 
 
Tab. 8 Overall effects of the pension reform on employment. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered on the individual level. Reference is cohort 1936. In all specifications, we control for labor supply and 
labor demand determinants. Significance levels: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. Source: SIAB 7514, own calculations. 
 
The second argument is that in contrast to our results for men, previous studies on the effects of the 
1992 German pension reforms on women found that employment increased with pension 
deductions (compare our literature review in Section 2). Practically all women affected by the 1992 
pension reform went into the pension for women and hardly any women chose a bridge option.26 
Although the bridge options allowed employment before ERA, the pension for women (ERA was the 
same for the pension for women and the bridge options) was more attractive for practically all 
women eligible for all three pension forms. Thus, the pension effects for women at age 60 are 
                                                                
26
 The share of women who chose the pension for the unemployed and partial retirement before and after the 
implementation of the 1992 pension reform was less than 2%, compare Geyer et al. (2019). 
26 
comparable to those for men at age 63.27 If bridge options and pension for the long-term insured had 
the same ERA, we therefore can assume that we would not have observed the shift of older men into 
bridge options with their associated employment decrease after age 60.  
Our third argument is that employers had to be willing to offer substantial sums of money to 
motivate employees to use a bridge option instead of the pension for the long-term insured, 
especially for the cohorts more strongly affected by the pension reform. Participation in partial 
retirement is voluntary and older employees eligible for the pension after unemployment are well 
protected against dismissals and therefore usually get severance pay when they are dismissed 
(Schmähl, 2003).28 Appendix B shows that realized financial cost differences between the pension for 
the long-term insured and the bridge options increased to 8 earnings months (or 28,000 EUR) for 
partial retirement and 10 earnings months (or 25,000 EUR) for unemployment.  
It is notoriously difficult to obtain information on compensation payments made by employers 
before a dismissal or partial retirement.29 The only information source on severance pay for 
dismissed employees we are aware of is the survey evidence provided by the German Socio-
Economic Panel. Grund (2006) and Jahn (2009) reported an average severance pay of between 
20,000 and 25,000 EUR in the years 2000–2006 in case of a mutual dismissal agreement. They found 
severance payments of up to 400,000 EUR and a large increase in severance pay with age and tenure. 
Severance pay increased by between 0.6 and 0.74 monthly earnings for each year of tenure. If we 
consider that older men in our sample had 15 years of tenure before they were dismissed, the tenure 
effect on severance pay alone would be at least 9 earnings months. Given that age has a separate 
positive effect on severance pay in addition to tenure, the calculations by Grund (2006) and Jahn 
(2009) are consistent with severance payments necessary to compensate older men for the financial 
costs of a dismissal compared with using the pension for the long-term insured. From the employer’s 
perspective, a dismissal was financially more attractive than partial retirement (Schmähl, 2003). 
Besides the severance pay and other possible compensations necessary to obtain the employee´s 
agreement for a dismissal, the firms faced almost no further costs when they dismissed their older 
employees. For partial retirement, employers had to form accruals for the passive phase of the block 
model and pay higher hourly wages for the entire period of partial retirement (see Appendix B). 
Oswald (1999) demonstrates that partial retirement was substantially more expensive for the 
employer than a dismissal ceteris paribus. 
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 In principle, women also could choose the pension for the long-term unemployed. This pension form 
however implied lower pension entitlements compared with the pension for women, and thus few women 
chose it (Lorenz et al., 2018). 
28
 Only employers with fewer than five employees are exempted from the dismissal protection rules that 
specifically protect employment of older employees. 
29
 Compensation and severance payments were not subject to social security payments, so they are not 
reported in our administrative social security data. 
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The high compensation costs necessary to induce older men to use a bridge option implies that 
mainly employers with high adaptation costs for an increase in employment of older men offer 
bridge options. In order to show this hypothesis empirically, we first argue which employer 
characteristics indicate high adaptation costs. The SIAB data set only entails a short list of employer 
characteristics and we therefore cannot present a structural model on the employer determinants 
for bridge options. In general, prolonging the employment of an older employee usually means that a 
young employee cannot be hired, does not get a promotion or has to be dismissed (Boeri et al., 
2016). In our estimation model for the usage of bridge options we therefore take indicators of how 
many younger employees are affected by a prolongation of employment of older employees and 
how costly this is for the employer.  
Employment adaption costs increase for employers with a strong need to reduce their workforce and 
the use of bridge paths therefore may be negatively correlated with the business cycle. If we assume 
that the regional unemployment level is positively related with the need to a workforce reduction, a 
high or an increasing regional unemployment rate30 should increase the probability that an employee 
uses a bridge path (Dorn and Sousa-Poza, 2010). Similarly, employers that enjoyed a growing 
workforce31 should use bridge paths less frequently. Large employers usually have a professional 
human resources department that can cope with the legal requirements for partial retirement. Large 
employers are also more frequently subject to a collective bargaining agreement and have a works 
council. Unions and works councils supported the usage of bridge options because they recognized 
them as a socially acceptable form of labor flexibility and therefore these industrial relation 
institutions reduced the costs of bridge options (Schmähl, 2003; Berg et al., 2019; BMAS, 2018). 
Finally, employers with a large share of employees aged 55–59 in the year before an employee 
retires, that is, employers with a high treatment intensity, should use bridge paths more because 
their adaptation costs are higher than those of firms with low treatment intensity (Boeri et al., 2016).  
In Table 9, our multivariate regression explains which older employees from our sample use a bridge 
option before retirement instead of the pension for the long-term insured employees. We control for 
many individual drivers of labor market decisions of older employees and the economic sector of the 
employer. Our ordinary least squares regression indeed shows that older men who work at larger 
employers, at employers in regions with high and increasing unemployment, and with a high 
treatment intensity used bridge paths more frequently. In contrast, older men who worked at 
                                                                
30
 We choose the regional unemployment level at age 55 and the change in regional unemployment in the year 
before entry into bridge employment or between age 54 and 55 for those who did not choose bridge 
employment to obtain values in the years the decision for or against a bridge option was taken. The results are 
robust if we take the unemployment (change) values at a later age up to 60. 
31
 We measure the change in employment in the last year before the employee entered the bridge path or 
between age 54 and 55, analogously. Varying the employment measurement at different ages produces robust 
results. 
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growing employers used the pension for the long-term insured. If we add employer information to 
the individual characteristics, R2 more than doubles from 0.049 to 0.11.32  
  
Employee uses bridge path 
before retirement 
Employer size × 10,000 0.070** 
 
(0.008) 
Regional unemployment rate at age 55 0.012** 
 
(0.001) 
Increase in regional unemployment in year before entry into bridge 
employment or between age 54 and 55 0.024** 
 (0.007) 
Growing employer -0.082** 
 
(0.007) 
Treatment intensity 0.414** 
 (0.040) 
  
Individual characteristics Yes 
R2 0.11 
Observations 
19,982 
Tab. 9. Determinants of bridge paths. Notes: Ordinary least squares regression. Standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered on the individual level. Individual characteristics included are pension wealth at age 55, six birth 
year dummies, highest education (three levels), tenure (three levels), and economic sector at the last employer 
prior to retirement. Significance levels: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. Source: SIAB 7514, own calculations. 
 
Our last argument that employer behavior drives the shift into bridge options during the 
implementation phase of the pension reform is provided by Dorn and Sousa-Poza (2010). They 
showed that half of those employees who retired early in Germany between 1984 and 1997 did so 
involuntarily. The involuntary retirement share was one of the highest in their international 
comparison spanning 19 countries and the share increased towards the end of the observation 
window. The large and increasing share of involuntary early retired in Germany is consistent with our 
interpretation that employers pushed many employees into partial retirement and the pension after 
unemployment. 
6  Policy implications 
We argue that the negative development in employment after ERA is a consequence of employers 
pushing their employees into bridge options. Early retirement options that give employers a say on 
employment exit are widespread. For partial retirement, Austria, Germany, Sweden, and some 
schemes in the Netherlands provide examples of rules that allow employers to influence when an 
employee exits employment. Some papers already show that employers used their influence on 
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 We obtain the qualitatively same results if we use a Probit regression instead of an ordinary least squares 
regression. 
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employment exit to reduce older employee employment. Graf et al. (2011) find that most employees 
in partial retirement substituted full employment for part-time employment and retired early in 
Austria. Therefore, employment exit age declined after the introduction of partial employment. 
Lachowska et al. (2009) performed a case study of employees at Stockholm University that showed 
that after controlling for individual retirement incentives, the financial situation of the university 
department had a highly significant negative effect on early retirement incidence. Allen et al. (2004) 
found that introducing partial retirement at the University of North Carolina caused a large share of 
employees to reduce working time at the end of their career and enter retirement earlier. In 
contrast, Wadensjö (2006) showed that Sweden’s partial retirement program on average led to a net 
increase in the number of hours worked by older workers. However, older workers opting for the 
partial retirement program had to give up another early retirement option that would have allowed 
them to exit the labor market even earlier than with the partial retirement program.  
Early retirement after unemployment also depends strongly on employer decisions. Many countries 
offer early retirement after a certain unemployment spell (for example, Portugal, Finland, Belgium, 
and the Netherlands, see European Commission, 2019). Employers in these countries might use 
compensation for financial losses of unemployment for employees enjoying dismissal protection in 
order to push them into early retirement (Cremer et al., 2009). Rabaté (2019) for example shows that 
the influence of employers on retirement age after dismissal without a cause (so-called “mandatory 
retirement”) had a negative effect on employment of older employees in France. 
The experience in Sweden and the differences in the employment changes during the 
implementation period of the 1992 pension reform between men and women in Germany point to 
an important proviso of our findings: the costly push of old employees into bridge options was only 
attractive for employers because bridge options had an ERA three years earlier than the earliest 
alternative ERA for the employees in our sample. 
7 Conclusions 
This paper shows that the increase in the NRA plus the introduction of pension deductions for 
retirement before the NRA did not have the intended positive pension reform effect on the 
employment of older men. During the implementation phase of the pension reform, employment 
declined by 1.2 months per annual increase in NRA. This finding markedly differs from theoretical 
predictions by the option value theory, empirical ex ante analyses of the 1992 pension reform in 
Germany, and international evidence on employment effects of comparable pension reforms. We 
found two main reasons for the negative employment development during the introduction phase of 
the pension reform: Strong substitution of employees from a pension for the long-term insured to 
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the bridge options unemployment and partial retirement and a decline in employment age of old 
men using the partial retirement option.  
The strong substitution of regular employment into the bridge options may partly have been an 
unintended side effect of the reform. Employers could have correctly expected that older employees 
eligible for the pension for the long-term insured would stay longer in employment (they in fact 
stayed five months longer on average at the end of the implementation period than before the 
reform). The depression phase during the implementation period of the pension reform led 
employers to use their influence to avoid employment adaptation costs induced by older employees 
who were free to opt for a later employment exit. Thus, employers were willing to compensate their 
employees for financial cost differences of using bridge options that amounted to up to 10 earnings 
months. Accordingly, we find that mainly employers with higher costs for keeping older employees 
longer in employment pushed their employees into the bridge options. 
Papers on reactions to pension reforms usually frame their models assuming forward-looking 
individuals who maximize their expected life-cycle utility in each period of time by deciding between 
labor market participation and retirement. These models imply autonomous employee decisions on 
retirement and do not consider employer behavior. Thus, these studies assume a perfectly elastic 
labor demand reaction to pension reforms. This assumption excludes the employers’ option to push 
employees into alternative retirement paths that imply an earlier ERA and an influence of the 
employer on employment exit. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that shows that 
employers have thwarted the expected positive employment effect of a pension reform by using 
their influence on employment exit of their older employees. Our results suggest that for pension 
types for which employees are not autonomous in their retirement decisions, employer behavior can 
have a decisive impact on the labor market effects of pension reforms.  
In light of our results, we assume that later increases in the NRA in Germany had stronger positive 
employment effects after the early retirement options after unemployment and partial retirement 
were abolished in Germany starting for birth cohorts 1952 (1999 pension reform). For older men 
born after 1952 who were eligible for bridge options, the pension for the long-term insured was the 
earliest retirement option and bridge options lost their attractiveness for employers with high 
employment adaptation costs. Our paper also suggests that similar pension reforms as the 1992 
pension reform introduced during boom phases may have a more positive employment effect. 
Employers are not willing to compensate employees for the financial costs associated with using 
earlier retirement options when it is not costly to keep older employees in work longer. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
Fig. A1. Employment rate (with working phase of partial retirement) by age (monthly data) and cohort. 
Source: SIAB 7514, own calculations. 
 
 
 Mean SD 
Characteristics of the last employer before labor market exit   
Number of employees in total 1,341.76 4,683.27 
Imputed gross daily earnings of full-time employees (EUR) 98.08 37.21 
Employee age (years) 41.89 4.75 
Age full-time employees (years) 42.29 4.6 
Share women 0.28 0.22 
Share full-time 0.83 0.17 
Share part-time 0.08 0.13 
Share regular 0.91 0.11 
Share apprentices 0.04 0.06 
Share women full-time 0.18 0.15 
Share women part-time 0.07 0.11 
Share regular full-time 0.83 0.18 
Share low-skilled 0.15 0.13 
Share medium-skilled 0.73 0.17 
Share high-skilled 0.12 0.16 
Share low-skilled full-time 0.09 0.11 
Share medium-skilled full-time 0.63 0.20 
Share high-skilled full-time 0.10 0.14 
Share 55–59 years old 0.12 0.10 
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1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941
35 
Share 60–64 years old 0.06 0.1 
Regional unemployment rate 10.57 4.2 
Individual characteristics  
  
Job exposure index: Overall Job Index 6.04 2.99 
Job exposure index: Overall Physical Exposure Index  6.22 3.03 
Job exposure index: Overall Psycho-social Exposure Index  5.35 2.84 
Job exposure index: Carcinogenic Agent Index 6.44 2.87 
Job exposure index: Heavy Work Index 5.68 2.87 
Pension wealth at age 55 235,801.9 59,321.2 
Tab. A1. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the multivariate regression in Table 5. Number of 
observations: 1,517,802. SD: standard deviation. Source: SIAB 7514, own calculations. 
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  Employment including partial retirement  
  I II III IV 
Penalty (%) -0.005**  -0.007** 
 
 
(0.0005)  (0.0005) 
 
No penalty 
 
Base 
 
Base 
0.3–3.6 -0.007** -0.011** 
 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
3.9–7.2  -0.031**  -0.040** 
 
 (0.004)  (0.004) 
7.5–10.8  -0.051**  -0.067** 
 
 (0.005)  (0.005) 
11.1–14.4  -0.062**  -0.087** 
 
 (0.007)  (0.007) 
14.7–18.0  -0.058**  -0.091** 
 
 (0.009)  (0.009) 
Observations 1,517.802 1,517.802 1,517.802 1,517.802 
X variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Y variables No No Yes Yes 
Pre-reform 
mean 
0.356    
R² 0.199 0.199 0.291 0.291 
Tab. A2. Regression results: direct effects on employment rate with partial retirement (both phases). Notes: 
In all specifications, we control for pension wealth at age 55, monthly cohort and age fixed effects, for changes 
in the legislation for disability pensions and in the entitlement rules for unemployment insurance, and for job 
exposure and education. In columns III and IV, we additionally control for the regional unemployment rates and 
employer characteristics. Standard errors are clustered on the individual level. Significance levels: *p < 0.05, 
**p < 0.01. The pre-reform mean is calculated for pre-reform cohorts 1935 and 1936. Source: SIAB 7514, own 
calculations.  
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Appendix B: Assessment of the financial disadvantages induced by the 1992 
pension reform costs by pension form 
This appendix assesses the changes in the financial disadvantages associated with the bridge options 
compared with the pension for the long-term insured given actual retirement behavior during the 
implementation phase of the 1992 pension reform.  
First, we calculate average pension deductions for all three pension forms. Table B1 shows that 
employees using the pension for the long-term insured had relatively low pension deductions. Their 
average pension deductions reached a peak of 2.2% for cohort 1939, and then decreased again.33 
Pension deductions reached a much higher level for those men using partial retirement (9.5%) and 
the pension after unemployment (8.5%) for birth cohort 1941. To get a rough estimation of the 
average financial costs of the pension reform for the retirees, we multiply the individual pension 
deductions with individual monthly pension eligibilities times the expected length of the retirement 
spell given the life expectancy of retirees in a birth cohort (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019). For the 
bridge options, we also consider financial disadvantages in earnings and pension eligibilities 
accumulated during the bridge phase. We calculate the financial disadvantage of the pension after 
unemployment by assuming that during the unemployment spell, transfers were 60% and collected 
pension entitlements were 80% of that of regular earnings (Engels et al., 2017). We calculate the 
costs for partial retirement by assuming that earnings during partial retirement were 75% and 
collected pension entitlements were 90% of regular earnings (Klammer and Weber, 2001; Berg et al., 
2019).  
Table B2 shows that the financial costs of the pension reform for those who used the pension for the 
long-term insured remained relatively low with a maximum of 15,000 EUR or 5 months earnings. 
Financial costs of those using the pension after unemployment increased from more than 15,000 
EUR in cohort 1937 to 39,500 EUR in cohort 1941. The costs of partial retirement even amounted to 
43,000 EUR in cohort 1941. If we compare the pension for the long-term insured with the pension 
after unemployment, the difference in financial costs increases from about 2 monthly earnings 
before the reform to 10 monthly earnings for cohort 1941. Financial costs for partial retirement 
amount to up to 8 months earnings compared with the pension for the long-term insured. Bridge 
options allow older men to retire substantially earlier than the pension for the long-term insured. If 
we take the difference in employment exit between pension for the long-term insured and the 
                                                                
33
 Although not all employees directly enter a pension after exiting employment (Hanel, 2010), our calculations 
of the realized pension deductions are similar to those published by the German pension insurance. Average 
pension deductions increased from 0.02% in 1997 to 0.05% in 1998, 0.08% in 1999 and 2000, and 0.10% in 
2001 (Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, 2018). Consistent with our results, Bönke et al. (2018) also found 
that pension deductions for employees using the pension for the long-term insured increased from cohort 1937 
to cohort 1939, and then decreased again. 
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pension after unemployment before the reform (cohort 1936) as reference, the leisure advantage 
when retiring early after unemployment hardly increased and it was always lower for those in partial 
retirement than in pension after unemployment. Therefore the necessary compensation to push 
employees into bridge options was higher during the implementation phase than before the reform. 
Cohort Average Pension for the unemployed Partial retirement Long-term insured 
1935 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1936 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1937 0.25 0.72 0.00 0.53 
1938 1.03 2.40 0.17 1.91 
1939 1.68 3.66 1.45 2.16 
1940 3.25 5.86 4.76 2.00 
1941 5.33 8.44 9.46 1.89 
Total 1.93 3.73 5.46 1.18 
N 3,010,722 9,198 2,494 13,190 
Tab. B1. Realized pension deductions by cohort by percent. Notes: Values in the columns correspond to the 
mean. Source: SIAB 7514, own calculations. 
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Cohort 
Total costs of 
pension after 
unemployment 
Unemployment 
costs 
Unemployment 
penalty costs 
Total costs of partial 
retirement 
Partial 
retirement costs 
Partial retirement 
penalty costs 
Total costs of pension 
for long-term insured 
1935 12,606 (4.27) 12,606      
1936 12,534 (4.16) 12,534      
1937 15,415 (4.50) 10,894 4,521  19,439 (6.15) 19,439 0 4,817 (1.79) 
1938 22,217 (6.08) 10,885 11,332  19,158 (5.99) 18,681 477  12,462 (5.05) 
1939 27,943(8.43) 12,205 15,738  23,476 (7.22) 19,512 3,964 15,297 (5.33) 
1940 33,856 (10.88) 13,140 20,716  31,289(9.63) 18,200 13,089 14,111 (5.05) 
1941 39,505 (14.94) 14,624 24,881  42,777 (13.29) 16,183 26,594  14,859 (5.00) 
Tab. B2. Calculation of pension penalty and bridge costs. In brackets: costs expressed in earnings in months in EUR. Source: SIAB 7514, own calculations. 
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